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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1960
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By EMORY L. O'CONNELL
Mr. O'Connell is an attorney practicing in the Denver area.
CRIMINAL CASES
There were in 1959 no startling decisions by our Supreme Court
affecting rules of evidence in criminal cases. There were, however,
several cases which deal with points of interest to the profession.
Evidence of Refusal to Take Test
Probably of most interest were two cases decided the same day,
dealing with evidence relating to the refusal of a defendant to sub-
mit to tests.
The court held that it was error for the trial court to permit a
witness to testify that the defendant had refused to take the so-
called paraffin test, in Brooke v. People.' The test is designed to
disclose whether or not the subject of the test has fired a gun within
recent hours. The court said that the testimony in the trial court,
and certain authorities, indicate that the test is not entirely reliable.
For this reason the court concludes that the results of the test
would not have been admissible, and therefore testimony of refusal
to submit to the test was incompetent.
In Mills v. People2 the defendant refused to take a lie detector
test. The Supreme Court held that it was error on the part of the
trial court to allow testimony to the effect that the defendant had
so refused. It is not entirely clear whether the court predicated its
conclusion on a constitutional basis or on possible unreliability of
the test, though it would appear that the latter controlled.
Similar Transactions
In Bledsoe v. People3 the court rather summarily disposed of
the question of admitting evidence of other similar transactions, but
affirmed the admission of such evidence on the authority of Mc-
Bride v. People4 and Munsell v. People.5 A reference to these cases
throws little light on the matter of admitting evidence of other
transactions.
In Stull v. People6 we find an extensive opinion on this prob-
lem with the following four rules delineated as guide posts:
1. The District Attorney should state the purpose for which
evidence of similar acts or transactions is offered.
2. Upon request of the party adversely affected by admission
of evidence of other acts or transactions, the trial court should at
the time of its reception direct the jury as to the only purpose for
which it may be considered. The court goes on to intimate that such
instructions should be given without request, but does not say that
failure to do so would be reversible error.
1 339 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1959).
2 339 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1959).
3 138 Colo. 490, 335 P.2d 284 (1959).
4 126 Colo. 277, 248 P.2d 725 (1952).
5 122 Colo. 420, 222 P.2d 615 (1950).
6 344 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1959).
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3. In its general instructions the trial court should instruct on
the limited purpose of such evidence.
4. Use of terms "other crimes," "other offenses," "similar of-
fenses," and the like should be carefully avoided.
Possession of Equipment Suitable
for Commission of Act Charged
The case of Baca v. People7 goes far in approving the admission
of evidence concerning the alleged possession of a gun in connec-
tion with burglary. Defendant was found in a burglarized drug
store, hiding behind a counter. A gun found on a shelf near the de-
defendant's hiding place was admitted in evidence. There was some
evidence that the proprietor had left no gun there and that none
was there when the store was closed. The court admitted some
doubts as to the propriety of admitting the gun as an exhibit be-
cause it was not conclusively shown to have been in the possession
of the defendant, but nevertheless affirmed the action of the trial
court. The court held that acquisition or possession of instruments,
tools, or other means of doing the act may be shown as signifying
the probable design to use the same in performance of the act
charged.
In Dechant v. People" it was contended that a knife should not
have been admitted in a trial on a charge of assault because there
was inconsistency in the testimony of the identifying officer. He
allegedly had previously testified differently in a hearing before a
justice of the peace. The Supreme Court quite properly held that
this was a matter of credibility and not of admissibility.
Admissibility of Confession
A confession, if voluntarily made, does not become inadmissible
in evidence because of the failure of the officers to inform the de-
fendant that his confession might be used against him. Castro v.
People.9 Here the court said that the basic question is, was the con-
fession voluntary? This is a question primarily for the trial court
and on review its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of
clear abuse.
Cross-Examination of Character Witnesses
In People v. Futamata0 the defendant was charged with rape.
The District Attorney attemped to cross-examine character wit-
nesses as to whether they had heard that defendant had phoned
women other than prosecutrix and used improper language. Ob-
jections were sustained by the trial court and the ruling was af-
firmed on writ of error. The cross examination had been objected
to as hearsay. The Supreme Court felt that although this type of
cross examination is proper, strict supervision by the trial court is
necessary, and in this case was sustained.
7 336 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1959).
345 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1959).
9 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
10 343 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1959).
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Motions and Objections in Trial of Defendants Jointly
A warning as to trial procedure is found in Thompson v. Peo-
ple." An officer testified that one defendant had stated to him that
"he had just been released three days previously." Counsel repre-
senting all defendants moved generally for mistrial. The motion
was denied by the trial court. The Supreme Court said the evi-
dence was admissible as against the one defendant only, but there
was no error in overruling a motion made on behalf of all defend-
ants.
Use of Deposition
In Trujillo v. People1 2 the trial court admitted the deposition of
a witness who testified on the taking of the deposition that he
would be out of the city at trial time. There was no proof of non-
availability at the trial. This, said the court, was error, but in view
of other testimony, not prejudicial.
CIVIL CASES
In the field of civil law, appellate rulings on evidence were not
revolutionary, but some cases are of interest and some may deserve
re-examination.
Experiments
There were two decisions on this question that make one won-
der where the line may be drawn.
In Kling v. City and County of Denver"s the plaintiff claimed
that damages sustained in an automobile accident were the result
of the unsafe and dangerous condition of a city street. A patrolman
was permitted to testify that three or four days after the accident
he drove his car over the same street at a comparable speed and
experienced "some difficulty in handling the car at the higher speed
involved." It was contended that the admission of this testimony
was error because of, among other things, the use of a different car,
a different time involved, and operation by a more experienced
driver. The court held that these variances go to weight and not ad-
missibility of the evidence, and admission was a matter in the dis-
cretion of the trial court.
11 336 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1959).
12 338 P.2d 102 (Colo. 1959).






Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank14 opens the door still
further. There a police officer testified that he first observed the
condition of the pavement at the place of the automobile accident,
then went to a place with "similar" conditions and made a test to
determine the speed necessary to make the skid marks observed at
the scene of the accident. At the trial, he gave precise testimony
as to the speed of the car in question immediately preceding the
accident.
The appellate court said such evidence is admissible if made
under conditions substantially similar to those which obtained on
the occurrence of the event. Here again the court said admission
was a matter of discretion with the trial court, and its exercise
would not be disturbed in the absence of abuse.
Hearsay
In Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co.' the trial court ad-
mitted a report of an army officer in Alaska who had served as in-
vestigating officer in attempting to determine the cause of death
of a fellow officer. The report contained conclusions and findings
of the investigating officer, together with affidavits considered at
the army hearing into the cause of death. The Supreme Court said
the admission of the entire report was clearly error, both under the
common law as to hearsay and under the federal statute.16 Here
again, as in Trujillo v. People,'7 the court ruled that in view of oth-
er evidence the admission of the report was not reversible error.
In American Medical and Dental Ass'n v. Brown 8 plaintiff in
error had been sued for services rendered by a doctor. She claimed
payment and delivery of a receipt, but could not produce the re-
ceipt. After an adverse judgment, a receipt was found, and the in-
stant case was brought to recover the previous payment. The plain-
tiff (former defendant) could not identify the doctor's signature on
the receipt and did not see him sign. The reviewing court held that
her positive testimony that she had paid the doctor his claim in full
and that he had handed her a receipt was sufficient to justify ad-
mission of the document.
In Askins v. Easterling9 the surviving husband claimed that
his deceased wife had wrongfully put title to certain property in
joint tenancy with her son. The property allegedly had been pur-
chased by the wife under an agreement to take jointly with the
husband. The trial court permitted testimony (a) of third persons
as to declarations of decedent to the effect that the property had
been purchased as a home for her husband and herself; (b) of a
real estate broker who handled the purchase of the property, to the
effect the husband had signed a purchase money note, which note
was not in evidence; and (c) conversations between the husband
and the wife at the time of the purchase.
The Supreme Court held there was no error. As to (a), state-
ments of a former owner which were made at the time he held the
property, and which were in derogation of his interest, are admissi-
14 338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959).
15 138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090 (1959).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958).
17 338 P.2d 102 (Colo. 1959).
18 344 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1959).
19 347 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1959).
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ble against a successor in interest; as to (b), the testimony was not
prejudicial, since it was merely cumulative. As to (c), the testi-
mony was admitted by the trial court as a declaration against the
pecuniary interest of the decedent. The Supreme Court held that
it might be treated as a verbal act introduced for the purpose of
evidencing, not the truth of the content of the statement, but rather
showing that a declaration was in fact made. However, it is obvious,
from a reading of the cited sections of Wigmore,2 0 that the court
intended to justify its admission as an "utterance forming a part
of the issue," rather than a "verbal act." It was competent to estab-
lish the contract relied on by the husband, which gave rise to a con-
structive trust.
Opinion Evidence
Our Supreme Court reversed the trial court in the case of John-
son v. Board of County Comm'rS2 1 because the trial court had re-
jected the testimony of an expert witness. The witness qualified as
an expert in design and construction engineering. The plaintiff,
Board of County Commissioners, had sued a truck company for
damage to a county bridge. It was proposed that the engineer testi-
fy as to the value of the bridge, based upon an examination of rec-
ords of the county concerning its history and various repairs, in-
cluding a record of materials used over the years. There was no in-
dication that he had examined the bridge itself.
A minister was held competent to testify as to the value of
meals in Young v. Burke.22 He qualified by stating that he had ob-
served preparation of some of the meals and had noted the quality
and quantity of the food. The court seems to say that a non-expert
may testify as to common, ordinary things within the knowledge of
the average layman, citing Wigmore on Evidence: "The general
tendency of courts, however, is toward a broad principle that no
special training or occupation is necessary to enable one to estimate
values."
23
An expert witness may testify as to an ultimate conclusion
which the jury is required to determine.2 4 An officer was allowed
to testify that in his opinion the accident in question was caused by
20 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1770 (3d ed. 1940).
21 336 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1959).
22 338 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1959).
23 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 712 (3d ed. 1940).
24 Bridges v. Lintz, 346 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1959).
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excessive speed. This the court held did not improperly invade the
province of the jury, but that the true test of admissibility is first,
whether the subject is sufficiently complex as to be susceptible of
opinion evidence, and second, whether the witness is properly
qualified to give an opinion.
Unacknowledged Deed
It is error to reject an offer of an unacknowledged deed which
is accompanied by an offer to prove by a witness that there was due
execution and delivery of the instrument by the grantor named
therein. Friend v. Stan-cato.
25
Mental Capacity of Witness
Every person of unsound mind is not incompetent to testify as
a witness.2 6 It was held that the mere fact that an individual has
been adjudicated a mental incompetent does not disqualify him as
a witness. A witness is not debarred on the ground of mental in-
capacity unless proof of disqualification is clear and conclusive. The
fact of mental adjudication has a bearing as to the weight, rather
than the admissibility, of the testimony.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
The res ipsa loquitur front was comparatively quiet in 1959,
after its extensive treatment last year in Weiss v. Axler.27 The court
in Weber v. Gamble Bldg. Co.28 held that the doctrine did not apply
to a fall sustained by plaintiff when ground gave way over a septic
tank. The evidence indicated that the tank had been installed by
defendant, but that the property had been in the possession and con-
trol of the plaintiff for five months after installation of the tank.
Miscellaneous
The so-called "Lord Mansfield" rule does not prevail in Colo-
rado. In Vasquez v. Esquibel,29 the court held that both the mother
of an alleged illegitimate child and the mother's husband could test-
ify as to non-access of the husband at the probable time of concep-
tion.
25 342 P.2d 643 (Colo. 1959).
26 Howard v. Hester, 338 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1959).
27 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958).
28 345 P.2d 727 (Colo. 1959).
29 346 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1959).
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